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Abstract
In the course of the Ebola outbreak in West Africa that was witnessed since early 2014, the response mechanisms
showed deficits in terms of timeliness, volume and adequacy. The authors were deployed in the Ebola campaign in
the West African country Liberia, where by September 2014 the changing epidemiological pattern made reconsiderations
of guidelines and adopted procedures necessary. A temporary facility set up as a conventional Ebola Treatment Unit in
the Liberian capital Monrovia was re-dedicated into a Severe Infections Temporary Treatment Unit. This facility allowed for
stratification based on the nosocomial risk of exposure to Ebola virus for a growing subgroup of admitted patients that in
the end would turn out as Ebola negative cases. At the same time, adequate diagnostic measures and treatment for the
non-Ebola conditions of these patients could be provided without compromising work safety of the employed staff. The
key elements of the new unit comprised a Suspect Cases Area similar to that of conventional Ebola treatment units for
newly arriving patients, an Unlikely Cases Area for patients with a first negative Ebola PCR result, and a Confirmed
Negative Cases Area for patients in whom Ebola could be ruled out. The authors, comprising representatives of
the Liberian Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, as well as infectious disease specialists from the German Ebola
Task Force are presenting key features of the adapted concept, and are highlighting its relevance in raising acceptance
for outbreak counter-measures within the population at stake.
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Background
With the aim of reducing the risk of nosocomial Ebola
infections within the facility [1], separating patients ac-
cording to their individual probability of having Ebola
Virus Disease (EVD) into three distinct categories (Suspect,
Probable and Confirmed Positive Cases) is a core part of
an Ebola Treatment Unit (ETU). However, during most of
the EVD outbreak in West Africa in 2014 to 2016, the sus-
pected cases were not classified further.
Although an ETU is considered a suitable and prag-
matic setting for managing Ebola patients, it is less ef-
fective for managing the needs of non-Ebola patients
due to the risk of nosocomial infection and lacking avail-
ability of diagnostic tools and differentiated therapeutic
regimens for non-Ebola conditions. Patients with Ebola-
like symptoms, however, were often denied access to
public health care facilities during the outbreak, leaving
them entirely without an adequate health care option.
According to the personal experience of the authors in
the course of the Ebola campaign and patient feedback
gathered in informal interviews, some patients with
Ebola-like symptoms preferred to stay at home rather
than to attend an ETU, owing to the possible risk of be-
coming infected with the Ebola virus. Furthermore,
* Correspondence: froeschl@lrz.uni-muenchen.de
†Equal contributors
2German Red Cross, Berlin, Germany
6Division of Infectious Diseases and Tropical Medicine, Medical Centre of the
University of Munich, Leopoldstr. 5, 80802 Munich, Germany
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© The Author(s). 2017 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver
(http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
Janke et al. BMC Infectious Diseases  (2017) 17:124 
DOI 10.1186/s12879-017-2235-x
ETUs were seen as a facility with a limited level of care
and a high mortality rate of well over 50%. A patient
who was admitted to an ETU and who later proved to
be negative for EVD may potentially have been exposed
to EVD within the facility and thus remained an “Ebola
contact” by definition [2]. In addition, in the ETU the
patient’s therapy was limited to a rudimentary spectrum
of empirical treatments for all conditions other than
Ebola. Following discharge from the ETU, these contact
cases had little realistic chance of obtaining subsequent
inpatient treatment at an ordinary health care facility in
the setting of the West African EVD outbreak [3].
Over the course of an Ebola outbreak, the positive pre-
dictive value of a given case definition varies significantly
due to changes in Ebola prevalence rates. In September
2014 when the Ebola prevalence was at its highest in
Liberia, nine out of ten suspect cases tested positive for
the Ebola virus [4]. Towards the end of 2014 this situ-
ation changed substantially. Fewer patients admitted to
ETUs eventually tested positive for the Ebola virus,
reflecting the considerably decreased positive predictive
value of the Ebola case definition in a low-incidence
phase of the outbreak. At that time around nine out of
ten suspected cases in any Liberian ETU turned out to
be Ebola virus negative and were thus unnecessarily ex-
posed to substandard care for conditions other than
Ebola and possibly also to still Ebola-infected patients in
the suspect wards. The altered balance between benefits
and risks by presenting to an ETU with a febrile condi-
tion resembling EVD were also recognized by the patients.
It is likely that this situation has had a crucial impact on
health decision making in the general public at that time.
Decreasing overall patient numbers presenting themselves
at the screening facilities corroborate this possibility, al-
though EVD-like illnesses such as malaria should have
continued to produce case numbers that should have been
comparable to peak periods of the Ebola outbreak. During
all phases there should have been numerous individuals
fulfilling the EVD case definition; at peak times patients
actually carrying Ebola virus, and in later phases patients
that were less frequently true Ebola cases and more fre-
quently cases of just Ebola-like diseases.
This was the situation in Liberia when on December
23rd, 2014 the SKD2 ETU in Monrovia, named after the
Samuel Kanyon Doe Stadium nearby became oper-
ational. The large size of the SKD2 facility and increased
facility quality requirements commissioned by national
and inter-governmental stakeholders proved to be a
challenge for the speed at which it became operational.
Coupled with setbacks during the construction period
due to delayed delivery of building materials (e.g., high
temperature incinerator) and delivery of broken mate-
rials (e.g., sewer pipes), the construction time for the in-
stallation was about 4 months.
This ETU was designed as a WHO standard 100 bed
ETU and was supported by the German government
with deployment of material and staff from both the
German Red Cross and the German Armed Forces. By
the end of December 2014 there were more than 1000
ETU beds available countrywide while the number of
hospitalized suspected Ebola cases had fallen to below
100 in the entire country. Due to the remaining fear of
Ebola many patients with non-EVD infectious diseases
were not admitted by ordinary health care facilities as
they were not prepared to manage potentially highly
contagious patients [5].
When the Ebola crisis was at its peak there may not
have been sufficient resources available to address this
problem. However, by December 2014 adequate re-
sources had been deployed in West Africa to enable
consideration of how best to manage non-EVD patients
with severe infectious diseases. The assumption that an
ETU is ethically, epidemiologically and medically an ap-
propriate place to admit any patient with Ebola-like
signs and symptoms was no longer sustainable.
Methods
Driven by these considerations and guided by a request of
the Incidence Management System of the Liberian Minis-
try of Health (MoH/IMS) to implement an adapted case
management concept the German Red Cross and German
Armed Forces joined efforts and expertise to meet this
task. There was a substantial need to conceive and
materialize a facility meeting the current epidemiological
situation at that time, which would be suitable for diagno-
sis and treatment of other relevant infectious diseases in
the context of an ongoing Ebola outbreak. The pilot pro-
ject of a Severe Infection Temporary Treatment Unit
(SITTU) was launched. In conventional ETUs, patients
were separated according to their risk of being infected by
Ebola virus. Whereas in the SITTU design patients were
separated by their probability of not being infected by
Ebola virus into suspect cases (any patient presenting and
fulfilling case definition criteria), unlikely cases (patients
with one negative Ebola Polymerase Chain Reaction
(PCR) result after admission) and confirmed negative
cases (patients testing negative for EVD twice 48 h apart).
Accompanied by a conventional ETU, either within
the facility complex or in close proximity, and by health
care facilities of the recovering national health services,
the SITTU design constitutes an integrated and opti-
mized patient management and treatment system (Fig. 1).
In a SITTU, just as in a conventional ETU, the patient
flow is unidirectional, starting from Suspect Cases Area
to the Unlikely Cases Area, to eventually the Confirmed
Negative Cases Area, as patients are segregated along
the risk of not having EVD. Patients fulfilling the case
definition criteria are admitted from the triage area to
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the Suspect Cases Area for a very short period of time
until the first Ebola PCR result is available. The length
of time for this initial assessment depends on the avail-
ability of quick PCR-results or alternative rapid tests
which may be available in the future. The design of this
area is restrictive in terms of inter-patient contact and
processes are designed to minimize the risk of a nosoco-
mial Ebola infection while the test is pending. Patient
areas within the Suspect Cases Area in the SITTU are
designed as spacious cubicles, allowing for a more strin-
gent isolation of patients, while simultaneously providing
a greater degree of individual privacy (Fig. 2).
Immediately following receipt of the first negative
Ebola result, patients are transferred to the Unlikely
Cases Area (Fig. 3) where a 2nd PCR is performed after
48 h. At this stage in the diagnostic algorithm, while the
Ebola Virus Disease cannot be entirely excluded, a po-
tentially infected patient is highly unlikely to be infec-
tious to other patients due to the low viral load which
may have rendered the first test result negative in an
assumedly early phase of infection. The rationale for the
48-h time interval was adopted from the Liberia Ebola
Virus Disease Clinical Management Manual issued by
the MoH/IMS [6]. In early phases of an acute Ebola
virus infection viral loads may still be found below the
limit of detection of any of the PCR assays that were in
use at that time. However, within 48 h the large majority
of these early cases is expected to have developed suffi-
ciently high viral loads to become detectable.
The key consideration of the Suspect Cases Area is to
maximise patient and staff safety, as here the eventual
infection status of each individual patient remains incal-
culable. Whereas the Unlikely Cases Area is primarily a
holding area for patients where a critical contagiousness
for Ebola virus can be virtually ruled out, which, in turn,
translates into a reduced risk for potential cross-
contamination. However, staff safety still remains crucial,
requiring personal protective measures until patients test
negative for the Ebola virus a second time. Any positive
Ebola PCR result either in the Suspect Cases Area or in
the Unlikely Cases Area would lead to the immediate re-
ferral of the corresponding patient to a conventional
ETU nearby.
When the second negative Ebola PCR taken 48 h after
admission is established, patients are either released
from the facility if no further clinical management is ne-
cessary, or they are transferred from the Unlikely Cases
Area to the Confirmed Negative Cases Area for further
inpatient care. Both the release from the facility and the
referral to the Confirmed Negative Cases Area require
an individual decontamination procedure of the patient,
involving the discarding of all clothing and personal
Fig. 1 The concept of an optimized ETU. The Severe Infection Temporary Treatment Unit (SITTU) in Monrovia consisted of a Suspect Cases Area,
an Unlikely Cases Area and a Confirmed Negative Cases Area, thereby representing only a part of the idealised facility pictured above (lower half
of the image). In the Monrovia scenario the complementary parts (as shown in the upper half of the Fig. 1) were represented by pre-existing
conventional ETUs near the SITTU. The two additional areas (Unlikely Cases Area and Confirmed Negative Cases Area, in the lower half of the
figure) allow an allocation of patients according to their risk of not being infected by Ebola virus with the aim of reducing the risk of nosocomial Ebola
virus infections and facilitating an adapted medical care
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items and a thorough full body shower with 0.05% chlo-
rinated water under observation of a staff member of
equal sex. In the Confirmed Negative Cases Area the
clinical management changes significantly. The Personal
Protective Equipment (PPE) used by the medical staff is
reduced to a conventional infectious disease unit stand-
ard. Consequently, the acceptable working time and the
ability to perform diagnostic procedures as well as inva-
sive medical interventions are extended substantially. A
field laboratory for blood count and clinical chemistry, a
variety of rapid tests, urine analysis, microscopy and a
mobile ultrasound device facilitate the shift from empir-
ical treatment to diagnosis-based therapies. Confirmed
negative patients can also be sent to external X-Ray ex-
aminations or referred to specialized departments such
as obstetrics.
In an environment that remained governed by fear of
Ebola, the general collapse of health services and the
drain of health professionals to Ebola Treatment Units
meant that transferring patients to Liberian hospitals
proved to be extremely challenging. The SITTU was able
to build up close working relations with local health care
facilities. This was important as it enabled the SITTU to
reintegrate patients into the national health care system.
This included patients with chronic infectious diseases
such as HIV/AIDS and Tuberculosis as well as patients
with an acute need of surgical interventions.
When the SITTU was finally operational and opened,
patients were admitted from different sources. Due to
the breakdown of the national health care system some
patients were transferred directly from conventional
ETUs to the SITTU after they had received one or two
negative Ebola PCR results, if they still were in need of
continued inpatient care. Numerous patients fulfilling
the Ebola case definition were brought in from the com-
munity by the Community Health Teams or presented
in the triage area voluntarily.
Results
In total 536 patients were registered during triage at the
SITTU in the course of its operation between January
and April 2015. Of the 536 documented patients that
were screened in the triage area, 224 met case definition
criteria and were admitted to the SITTU. Eight patients
left against medical advice and were followed up by our
psychosocial unit. The SITTU closed on April 19th. In
total 28 patients died in the facility, and 27 patients were
referred to other health care facilities for further treat-
ment. In three patients the outcome was undocumented.
The remaining 158 patients recovered after treatment
within the Confirmed Negative Cases Area and were
eventually discharged (Fig. 4).
The SITTU primarily treated adults and only a few
children (Fig. 5). In Monrovia a facility by Doctors With-
out Borders (MSF) admitted children under the age of 5
years with Ebola-like symptoms for further diagnostic
testing and treatment. Therefore, this patient group was
mostly referred directly to the MSF facility, leaving this
age group underrepresented at the SKD2 facility. The
remaining admitted children under the age of 5 years
and all pregnant women were placed in the maternity
ward of SKD2, an additional annex consisting of a small
ward where patients were located all along the diagnos-
tic cascade, until they were either referred to an external
ETU if tested positive or transferred to the Confirmed
Negative Cases Area if tested twice negative for Ebola
virus. Overall, 56.4% of the patients admitted to the
SITTU were male, and 43.6% female.
As far as could be determined, the patients admit-
ted had not had any contact with a known Ebola case
or body fluids of severely ill index patients suspected
of being EVD cases. Only two patients had attended
a funeral in the past month. Unfortunately, the data
on risk profile of admitted patients are incomplete
Fig. 2 Interior View of the SITTU. The aluminium and sheeting
structure is built on sealed concrete foundations. In the cubicles on
the left, each compartment is dedicated to one individual patient.
Within these cubicles only strictly personalized items such as chairs,
drip stands and closets are placed. Individual buckets were provided
for personal hygiene and sanitation to avoid mixing of the patients
in lavatories or toilets. The patients were requested not to move
within the structure
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because some patients were too ill to partake in a
complete interview. Only three patients stated to have
worked as health care workers.
The majority of admitted patients were eventually di-
agnosed with malaria, followed by gastroenteritis and
HIV/AIDS-associated complications and acute respira-
tory infections (Table 1). In April 2015 an increase in
patients with measles was detected with two admitted
cases. Comparable to the local availability of diagnostic
means prior to the Ebola outbreak many diagnoses in
the SITTU were still based on clinical presentations
alone, such as in cases of suspected measles.
The aim of the SITTU was to treat and isolate patients
with Ebola-like symptoms and discharge or transfer
Fig. 3 The German Severe Infections Temporary Treatment Unit. The German Unit at the SKD Football Stadium in Monrovia, Liberia, previously
designed as a regular Ebola Treatment Unit, now re-designed into a Severe Infection Temporary Treatment Unit, representing the lower half of
Fig. 1. In the course of increasing evidence of non-Ebola virus infection patients are referred between wards from left to right. In case of a positive
Ebola virus PCR result patients are referred to a conventional ETU nearby. Please note that the banners at the fence are still presenting an ETU;
these banners date back to the start of construction of the facility, when it was still meant to be an ETU. After rededication into a SITTU
the banners remained unchanged
Fig. 4 Patient Outcome at the SITTU. Outcome variable for patients is categorized as “died” for all patients that were admitted alive and died
within the SITTU, “home” for all patients that could be released into their community, requiring none or minimal further medical care, and
“transferred” for all patients that were transferred to other health care facilities for specialized care
Janke et al. BMC Infectious Diseases  (2017) 17:124 Page 5 of 8
them to the Confirmed Negative Cases Area once
they tested negative for Ebola twice over the course
of 48 h. In the initial phase the transfer options from
the SITTU to other specialized facilities within the
capital Monrovia for confirmed EVD negative pa-
tients were practically nonexistent. Due to reopening
clinics, national health care projects and improved
networking with additional health care facilities the
patients’ holding time within the SITTU decreased
over time (Fig. 6).
No patient admitted to the SITTU tested positive for
EVD. Confirmed patient numbers across Liberia
dropped to single case levels soon after the SITTU
opened. Lacking an ongoing reason to be, the SITTU
was closed after the last reported Liberian Ebola case at
the end of April 2015. Liberia was declared free of Ebola
virus transmission for the first time on May 9th 2015.
Discussion
The SITTU is an entirely new concept and can be ap-
plied and adapted to many different settings. In the 2014
to 2016 Ebola outbreak it filled the gap between the
existing health care facilities and the ETUs. During this
time, it is estimated that due to the collapse of the health
care system Ebola could have caused more than 10,000
additional deaths from malaria alone [7]. The question is
raised as to how far an Unlikely Cases Area and even a
Confirmed Negative Cases Area can still be an integral
part of Ebola case management. Although these compo-
nents admittedly focus on non-Ebola cases, we contend
that they do contribute an added value to the overall
Ebola case management system in three ways. First and
foremost, an improved case management realized
through the SITTU concept makes exposure of non-
Ebola patients to EVD patients within the treatment
Fig. 5 Age Distribution of Admitted SITTU Patients. The histogram with a bin width of 5 years shows the age distribution for each operational
calendar month
Table 1 Morbidity Profile of Admitted SITTU Patients
Malaria Gastro-enteritis HIV/AIDS ARI Other Total
January 2 (16.7%) 0 (0%) 1 (8.3%) 1 (8.3%) 8 (66.7%) 12 (100%)
February 13 (19.7%) 7 (10.6%) 5 (7.6%) 8 (12.1%) 33 (50.0%) 66 (100%)
March 28 (31.1%) 6 (6.7%) 13 (14.4%) 5 (5.6%) 38 (42.2%) 90 (100%)
April 32 (57.1%) 8 (14.3%) 2 (3.6%) 2 (3.6%) 12 (21.4%) 56 (100%)
Total 75 (33.5%) 21 (9.4%) 21 (9.4%) 16 (7.1%) 91 (40.6%) 224 (100%)
Most frequent diagnoses, by month of admission (% of all patients admitted in the corresponding month). ARI acute respiratory infections (upper and
lower combined)
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facility extremely unlikely. Second, the SITTU provides
a substantially higher level of clinical care for non-
Ebola patients, thereby improving their outcome as well
as potentially increasing acceptance of Ebola-specific
facilities by patients with Ebola-like symptoms. The
SITTU plays an essential part in identifying the
remaining few index patients. From an epidemiological
point of view, the last point is of paramount import-
ance for ensuring that the transmission cycle is broken
through sufficient numbers of true EVD cases being
isolated. Third, ordinary health care facilities are pro-
tected from potential Ebola patients that they are ill-
equipped to manage.
During the pilot project in Monrovia the SITTU ap-
proach proved to be effective beyond a theoretical con-
cept. The concept was developed in Liberia at the end of
2014 for a number of reasons: in order to meet emerging
necessities; so as to support an understanding within the
community that continued screening efforts are crucial
for identifying the final cases in the Ebola response; as
well as to allow for a controlled and safe re-installation
of the regular national health services, and to provide
adequate health services to the large majority of patients
showing Ebola-like symptoms yet suffering from other
infectious diseases.
The authors are aware and critical of the substantial
delay that the facility they were responsible for in
Monrovia suffered from until finally becoming oper-
ational. However, in the course of the rather short
operationalization of the SITTU it became very clear
that this concept was an essential contribution to patient
care in the midst of an EVD outbreak. It is hoped that
with the dissemination of the hereby presented experi-
ences a future implementation of the SITTU concept in
the course of an outbreak of a highly infectious disease
will arrive in a timely and integrated manner.
In conclusion, the SITTU concept provides a bridge
between the emergency response phase, as represented
by ETUs, and the recovery phase of national health ser-
vices. This transitional period also allows staff to be
reassured, equipment reallocated and guidelines on safe
structures and procedures readjusted. Ebola Treatment
Units are exceptionally complex from an ethical, med-
ical and epidemiological point of view. During an out-
break each of these aspects has to be considered
separately and continuously so as to adjust treatment
policies in response to changing epidemiological pat-
terns and behavioral dynamics. The Severe Infection
Temporary Treatment Unit was a necessary and useful
adaptation of Ebola case management protocols during
the Ebola outbreak in Liberia, and may be transferrable
to other settings.
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ETU: Ebola treatment unit; EVD: Ebola virus disease; MoH/IMS: Ministry of
Health/Incidence Management System; MSF: Médecins sans Frontières/
Doctors without Borders; PCR: Polymerase chain reaction; PPE: Personal
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Fig. 6 Length of Admission over Time at the SITTU. The histogram with a bin width of 2 days shows the patient counts on the y-axis over length
of admission time on the x-axis, for each operational calendar month
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